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An historical introduction is made tying authoritarianism with

ambiguity tolerance.

Ambiguity tolerance is a personality variable in

its own right, often associated with authoritarianism. yet remaining
separate from it.
Ambiguity intolerance is defined as the tendency to perceive and
interpret information that is marked by vague, fragmented, incomplete,
inconsistent, contradictory, or ·on.clear meaning as actual or potential
sources of psychological threat.

Ambiguity tolerance is defined as the

tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as challenging and desirable.
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Efforts to measure ambiguity tolerance have met with varied success,
however, it was not until Norton (197S) developed the Measurement of
Ambiguity Tolerance (MAT-50) that accurate measurement became a possibility.
The present study presents data that provides some construct validity to
the MAT-SO.
College students were administered the MAT-SO and divided into two
groups:

tolerants and intolerants.

It was hypothesized that individuals

who were in the intolerant group would produce more anxiety (as measured
•

by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory) when presented with an ambiguous

situation (the Rorschach inkblot test) than individuals in the tolerant
group.

The hypothesis was confirmed, individuals in the intolerant

group displayed more state as well as trait anxiety than those in the
tolerant group.

Recommendations are made suggesting that future research

use subjects from a less homogenous group.
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HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
Historically, tolerance to ambiguity has often been referred to in
conjunction with personality variables such as rigidity, prejudice,
authoritarianism, dogmatism and ethnocentrism.
of personality variables is authoritarianism.

Primary in this list
The initial work on this

subject after World War II was concerned with the potential fascist.
At the time the data were collected the most extreme example of fascism
in history had just been defeated in war.

Interest was intense and

it was the major concern of researchers to identify individuals who
would readily accept fascism if it should become a strong or respectable
social movement.

In the opinion of many, no politico-social trend

imposed a graver threat to traditional values and institutions than that
of fascism, and knowledge of the personality forces that favor its
acceptance would ultimately prove useful in combating it (Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950).
The authoritarian individual has been described by Masling (1954)

as one:
••• who worries about egocentric and material things and
thinks in terms of blame and appears to express aggression
against the weak. Not only this, but authoritarians are
co~ventional, submit uncritically in the face of authority,
are anti-intraspective, superstitious, and stereotypic in
their thinking, are preoccupied with the dominance-submission,
strong-weak, leader-follower dimension, overemphasize the
conventionalized attributes of the ego, have exaggerated
assertions of strength and toughness, are cynical and
destructive, tend to believe that wild and dangerous things
go on in the world and have exaggerated concern with
sexual 'goings on'. In addition, authoritarian men are
overly masculine and women are overly feminine.l
1

Joseph M. Masling, "How Neurotic is the Authoritarian?"
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1954, 49(2), 316.
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Authoritarian individuals tend to be rigid and inflexible, intolerant to
ambiguous situations, prejudiced, compulsive, punitive, aggressive to
unconventional individuals, and sometimes sadomasochistic.
As more data were collected, it was found that other dimensions,
often associated with authoritarianism were personality variables in
their own right and occurred apart from this single dimension.

The

analysis of tolerance-intolerance of ambiguity is an interesting
personality variable often associated with authoritarianism yet it
stands apart from it (Budne1, 1962; MacDonald, 1970).
DEFINITION OF AMBIGUITY TOLERANCE
In an effort to obtain an implicit definition of ambiguity, Norton

(1975), consulted all of the articles dealing with ambiguity as referenced
in the Psychological Abstracts from 1933 to 1970.

After content analysis,

eight categories emerged involving 125 uses of the term "ambiguous".
Table I abstracts the categories and the percent of uses in each category
(Norton, 1975).
An ambiguous situation may be defined as a situation which cannot be

structured or categorized by the individual because of the lack of sufficient cues.

Three types of ambiguous situations are suggested:

a contra-

dictory situation in which different elements or cues suggest differing
conclusions, a completely new situation in which there are no familiar
cues, and a complex situation in which there are a great number of cues
to be taken into account (Budner, 1962).
Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) and Norton (1975) define intolerance of ambiguity
as a tendency to perceive or interpret information that is vague, fragmented, incomplete, unstructured, uncertain, inconsistent, or contradictory as
actual or potential sources of psychological threat.
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TABLE I
USES OF THE TERM AMBIGUOUS
Category
I.

Percent of
Use

Multiple Meanings:
The stimulus was considered ambiguous by the researcher
when it entailed at least two meanings, whether the person
was aware or unaware of the multiple meanings, or clear or
unclear about them.

II.

Vagueness, Incompleteness, Fragmented:
If parts of the whole were missing, the stimulus was
designated as ambiguous. Examples include imcomplete
line tracings or fragmented figures.

III.

9%

Uncertainty:
Ambiguous was equated to the state of mind it created-namely, uncertainty. In this sense, ambiguity was considered
a consequent of a situation, event, interaction, etc.

VII.

10%

Lack of Information:
A situation in which there was no information or very little
information was treated as an ambiguous situation.

VI.

12%

Unstructured:
A stimulus which has no apparent organization or only partial
organization was considered ambiguous.

V.

18%

As a Probability:
A stimulus was treated as though it were ambiguous if it could
be analyzed as a function of a probability. Broen (1960),
for instance operationalized ambiguity in terms of various
combinations of interpretation response probabilities.

IV.

28%

9%

Inconsistencies, Contradictions, Contraries:
Any stimulus or stimulus set which entailed discrepant infor8%
mation was considered ambiguous. For example, if a set of
information suggested that something could be X and not-X at
the same time, that set of information would be labeled ambiguous.

VIII.

Unclear:
Sometimes ambiguous was used synonymously with the word unclear. 5%
For example, McBride and Moran (1967) defined something that is
unambiguous as a dimension which may be summarized as the clarity
of the statement.
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Ambiguity tolerance, on the other hand, is defined as the tendency
to perceive ambiguous situations as challenging and desirable.

Tolerant

individuals seek out and enjoy ambiguous situations and often excel in
the performance of ambiguous tasks (MacDonald, 1970).

However, Meek (1967)

proposed that extreme tolerance of ambiguity could be manifested by
indifference, detachment, and lack of involvement.

She states:

A person who is extremely tolerant of ambiguity may perceive
ambiguous stimuli and become anxious but he deals with the
aroused anxiety through various forms of withdrawal or denial.
An individual extremely intolerant of ambiguity, on the other
hand, reacts to the anxiety associated with ambiguity by attempting
to do something actively about the ambiguity through such means
as premature closure, extreme structuring, or through making
definite commitments ••• both of these forms of behavior can
be maladaptive.2
It is evident that the tolerance-intolerance continuum is not simply a
case of separating the "good guys" from the "bad guys", but for the purpose
of this paper and in accordance with the bulk of empirical evidence,
ambiguity tolerance will be considered a more adequate adjustment
mechanism than ambiguity intolerance.
The problem of identifying tendencies to perceive ambiguous situations
as potential sources of threat has been given some consideration by Budner
(1962).

He suggests that responses by an individual to stimuli takes

place on at least two levels, the phenomenological and the operative.
The phenomenological occurs in the world of individual perceptions and
feelings, while the operative remains in the world of natural and social
objects.

In one instance, the individual perceives, evaluates and feels

2
Phyllis M. Meek, "Extreme Tolerance of Ambiguity: A Manifestation
of Maladaptive Behavior," Diss. Abstracts, 1968, 29(3-B), 1162.
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(subjective}, while in the other instance he behaves or acts in some manner
with reference to the external environment (objective}.

Budner insists

that by obtaining indicators of response on both levels, it is possible
to achieve a more accurate estimate of an individual's tolerance-into!erance of ambiguity than can be derived from indicators limited to only
one level of response.
Briefly, the range of possible reactions to threat may be classified
rather crudely into submission anc denial.

By submission it is meant

that the ambiguous situation is recognizable as an ineluctable fact of
existence which cannot be altered by the individual.

By denial it is

meant that the performance of some act by which the objective reality,
even if only in the phenomenological world of the individual, is altered
to suit the desires of the perceiver.

Thus, it is plausible to infer

that the individual is in some way threatened if he exhibits one of the
following types of response:

phenomenological submission (anxiety and

discomfort}, operative denial (destructive or reconstructive behavior},
and operative submission (avoidance behavior}.

If these behaviors are

elicited by experiences and situations which are characterized by complexity, novelity, vagueness, inconsistance or insolubility, it would
be plausible to assume that the individual is intolerant of ambiguity
(Budner, 1962}.
Traditionally, the concepts of rigidity and ambiguity intolerance
have been confused -- often the terms are used interchangeably.
I

However,

Budner (1962} and MacDonald (1970} suggest that although the two concepts
are related, they are theoretically and empirically separate.

Ambiguity

intolerance suggests tendencies to relate to and interact in differing
ways with certain classes of events or phenomena; rigidity, on the other
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hand, refers to a more generally pervasive singular response mode.

A

rigid individual may be viewed as one who perseverates in a specific
response (in spite of contrary empirical evidence) whereas an intolerant
person may be likely to replace one response with another.

Example:

An

intolerant person and a rigid person may both be anxious for closure in
an ambiguous situation and seize upon immediate answers or conclusions
to the problematic situation.

After accepting a seized upon premature

conclusion or answer, the rigid person will tenaciously hold to his
opinion even in the face of contradictory evidence.

The ambiguity

intolerant person, on the other hand, will willingly exchange a premature
conclusion for a more adequate one.

As a result, an individual may be

intolerant of ambiguity while remaining flexible although the two variables
are very often found together (Budner, 1962; MacDonald, 1970).

PERSONALITY CORRELATES
Ambiguity Tolerance
Tolerance of ambiguity has been viewed historically as an adaptive
cognitive control mechanism which possibly represents a capacity for
dealing with open-ended or unstructured stimulus situations.

It has been

implied throughout the available literature that high tolerance of
ambiguity is in itself a valid index of underlying psychological health
and adjustment (Foxman, 1976).

Other adaptive personality traits have

been correlated with ambiguity tolerance also.

These traits include:

tolerance for ethnic differences, tolerance for interpersonal conflict,
disposition to inhibit permature closure C'jumping to conclusions"),
greater internal locus of evaluation, willingness to volunteer and experience new and novel things, proficiency with ambiguous tasks, and a high
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but which turns out to be reality inadequate -- the environment simply is
not organized around easily predictable determinates and an either/or
approach.
Ambiguity intolerance has been correlated with many personality
variables.

However, not all personality variables correlated with

ambiguity tolerance are always manifest with it.

The reader should

maintain high tolerance to this ambiguous personality variable to best
understand its subtle constituents.

Personality variables and behaviors

often associated with ambiguity intolerance include:

conventionality;

need for structure; authoritarianism; ethnocentrism; dogmatism; rigidity;
obsessional and perserverative tendencies; favorable attitudes toward
censorship; asking for suggestions; belief in a divine power; prejudice;
narrow-mindedness; manifest anxiety and guilt; low academic achievement;
concreteness of thinking, constricted and inhibited; dislike of abstract
art; premature need for closure, "jumping to conclusions"; and excessive
avoidance of ambiguous situations (Budner, 1962; Chabassol, Thomas, 1975;
Davids, 1955; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; MacDonald, 1970; Martin, 1954;
Norton, 1975, 1976; O'Conner, 1952; Rehfisch, 1958; Rokeach, 1951;
Troldahl, Powell, 1965).

In addition, Budner (1962) found that medical

students entering pediatrics or surgery were more intolerant of ambiguity
than students entering psychiatry, suggesting that those who are intolerant
of ambiguity tend to choose relatively structured professions.
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DEVELOPMENTAL HYPOTHESIS
The available literature is sparse with theoretical hypothesis for
the origin of ambiguity intolerance-tolerance.

The present author finds

no theoretical explanation for the development of ambiguity tolerance and
only one attempt by Frenkel-Brunswik (1949, 1950) to establish empirical
evidence for the development of ambiguity intolerance.
Primary to Frenkel-Brunswik's concept of the development of ambiguity
intolerance is the psychoanalytic concept of "ambivalence".

In Freudian

theory, ambivalence is defined as the coexistence, in the same individual,
and of love and of hate-cathexis toward the same object.

The existence

of ambivalence and an individual's ability to face his or her ambivalences
toward others is considered a very important personality variable.

Ability

to recognize such coexistences is, in all probability, another personality
variable apart from the concept of ambivalence.

At one end of the con-

tinuum as defined by this ability, lies ambiguity intolerance -

the

tendency to resort to black or white solutions, to arrive at premature
closure and to seek for unqualified and unambiguous acceptance or rejection
of other people.

Some individuals are more likely than others to see

positive as well as negative features in their parents and can accept those
feelings of love and hate with little display of anxiety or conflict.
Others seem intent on dramatizing their image of their parents with the
parent being viewed as altogether good or altogether bad.
In early childhood there are many rigid, external rules that a child
must learn.

Dichotomies customarily upheld in most homes include:

dominance-submission, badness-goodness, cleanliness-dirtyness, and
masculinity-femininity as well as a plethora of other less obvious
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dichotomies.

The rigidity and extremity in which these dichotomies are

viewed by the child seems contingent upon the extent to which the parent

stresses these differences as well as the severity of discipline experienced by the child for the nonadherence to his parents' view.

Discipline

experienced by children of intolerant parents typically is viewed as
ego threatening, traumatic, overwhelming, and unintelligible as compared
to more flexible homes where discipline is more intelligent and non-egodestructive.

In homes with rigid orientation the discipline is more often

based upon the expectation of a quick learning of external, rigid, superficial rules beyond the comprehension of the child.

Family relationships

tend to be based solely upon roles clearly defined in terms of dominance
and submission (Levinson, 1949).

It seems that the degree of tolerance-

intolerance depends upon the atmosphere of the home and expectations
regarding the behavior of the child whether emphasis is placed upon quick
action leading to tangible and concrete results with little understanding
of finer discriminations or where progress toward higher developmental
stages is encouraged especially with the development of insight.
Reduction of fear and a tolerance toward weaknesses in the child would
seem necessary to avoid rigidification of values.

Other factors contributing

to the "rigidification" of the personality would include extreme stress
upon stereotyped behavior, an expectancy of self-negating submission,
and an inducement to repress unacceptable tendencies.
Data from research by Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) suggests that parents
of rigid, intolerant children tend to feel socially and economically
marginal to the group from which they wish acceptance and the parents
develop a desperate clinging to external and rigid rules.

It seems likely

that the less secure parents are in their feelings of belonging the more
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they will insist on maintenance of cultural norms both in themselves and
in their children.

This rigid adherence to norms provides the theoretical

basis upon which the avoidance of ambiguity stands.

In order to maintain

complete adherence to norms and stereotyped patterns, certain aspects of
experience must be avoided or suppressed from consciousness.
MEASUREMENT OF AMBIGUITY TOLERANCE-INTOLERANCE
There has been a variety of interest in the measurement of ambiguity
tolerance-intolerance.

The first attempt to measure tolerance of ambiguity

was made by Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) in which a picture of a dog was shown
and then followed by other pictures representing a gradual transformation
of the dog into a cat.

Individuals who maintained their original response

despite contradictory empirical evidence were considered to be intolerant
of ambiguity.

However, as noted earlier by the present author, Frenkel-

Brunswik confounded the concept of ambiguity intolerance with rigidity,
More recent attempts have been made to construct paper and pencil
tests of ambiguity tolerance, but unfortunately the efforts have not met
with a great deal of success.

For example, Ehrlich (1965) substantially

discredited Walk's A Scale when she reported it had no internal consistency.
Likewise, Childs (1965) reported an internal consistency r of .16 (alpha
coefficient) for his ambiguity tolerance scale.
In 1962 Budner developed a scale of ambiguity tolerance-intolerance
that met with mild success.

Soon after, Rydell and Rosen (1966) developed

a scale which received revision by MacDonald (1970) and had a split-half
reliability coefficient of .73 and a retest stability coefficient of .63
as well as showing evidence of construct validity.

However, it was not
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until Norton (1976) developed the Measure of Ambiguity Tolerance (MAT-50)
that accurate measurement became a possibility (see Appendix A).
The MAT-50 was revised seven times, revising and combining some of
the previous scales mentioned above.

Internal reliability (Kuder-

Richardson 20) for the final revision was an r of .88 and a retest
reliability (after three months) of .86.

Norton (1975) hypothesized

that if content validity was high on the MAT-50, high tolerant people
should perceive themselves as such, and low tolerants, conversely.
To test this hypothesis graduate students were asked to imagine, when
completing the MAT-50, that they were very highly tolerant of ambiguity.
Likewise the same number were asked to imagine that they were very
intolerant of ambiguity.

The results revealed that those imagining

they were extremely tolerant scored at the extreme end of the scale
indicative of tolerance of ambiguity.

Imagined low tolerants likewise

scored at the other extreme end of the scale.

The results indicate that

the MAT has high content validity.
Three different experiments provided substantial evidence for
construct validity (Norton, 1975).

The person who had high measured

tolerance of ambiguity tended to volunteer for undefined

experimen~s

more readily than intolerant individuals, likewise the person tended to
use a different set of aesthetic judgments when viewing works of art.
Tolerant individuals preferred vague, abstract and impressionistic art
over more defined and concrete art.

Intolerant individuals tended to ask

for suggestions in small group discussions more often than tolerant persons.
Obviously, these three experiments do not exhaust the research
possibilities concerning the construct validity of the MAT-50.

However,
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based upon the results of these studies, one should be able to be
increasingly confident that the scale measures what it purports to
measure (Norton, 1976).

EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND TECHNIQUE
The present author proposed an experiment that would potentially
lend construct validity to the MAT-50.

The experiment consisted of

determining tolerant and intolerant individuals as measured by the MAT-50,
subjecting those individuals to an ambiguous situation and then measuring
the degree of anxiety produced · by the situation.

Individuals who are

indicated as being intolerant of ambiguity by the MAT-50 should become
more anxious than individuals whose MAT-50 scores indicate to be tolerant.
Experimental Method
Fifty individuals were administered the MAT-50, those individuals
scoring one standard deviation above the mean were designated tolerant,
while those scoring one standard deviation below the mean were designated
intolerant.

The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was administered to the

tolerant and intolerant individuals.

Immediately following the administration

of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory the individuals were subjected to
a group administration of the Rorschach.

Traditional group Rorschach

administration procedures were followed as outlined by Harrower and
Steiner j_n Large Scale Rorschach Techniques (1973).

Immediately following

the administration of the group Rorschach, the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory was again administered.

After scoring both administrations of

the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, statistical computations were performed
consisting of an analysis of variance, two-factor mixed design, repeated
measures on one factor.
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Experimental Subjects
Fifty student volunteers enrolled in introductory psychology courses
were used as subjects in this experiment.

Approximately 31 of the vol-

unteers were female and approximately 19 were male.
from 17 - 45 years with a mean age of 25.6 years.

The age range was
There were 15

individuals in the intolerant group and 11 in the tolerant group.
Experimental Rationale
The group Rorschach has been chosen as an ambiguous situation due
to its recognized ambiguity and its administrative facility as well as
its measure of anxiety.

However, the Rorschach does not distinguish

between state and trait anxiety; therefore, its use as a measure of
anxiety produced by intolerance of ambiguity is limited.

Because of this

limitation, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was administered giving
measures of both long-term anxiety (trait) and transitory anxiety (state).
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory is known to be an effective measure
of anxiety (Newmark, 1974).
reliability and validity.

It was chosen for its ease of administration,
Spielberger (1970) adequately discusses the

reliability and validity of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.

Newmark,

Hetzel and Frerking (1974) found that the mere process of taking
the Rorschach produces an increase in the state anxiety that abates
within twenty-four hours

~

trait anxiety remained unchanged after the

administration of the Rorschach.
Experimental Hypothesis
The intolerant group will react to the ambiguous situation with
greater state anxiety than the tolerant group.
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Experimental Results
The hypothesis was confirmed.

Significantly more state anxiety

was produced by the ambiguous situation in the intolerant group than the
tolerant group at the .025 level of significance.

Table II indicates

the results of analysis of variance of state anxiety conditions.

The

intolerant group also showed more trait or long-term anxiety than the
tolerant group (see Table III).
TABLE II
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - STATE ANXIETY
SOURCE

df

7,680

47

4,772

23

402

1

402

66,382

22

3,017

2,908

25

Trials

221

1

221

2.483

< .20

Trials X
Condi tons

640

1

640

7.191

< .025

2,047

23

89

TOTAL
BETWEEN SUBJECTS
Conditions
Errorb
WITHIN SUBJECTS

Error
w

I

-

ms

p

SS

F

.133

0
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TABLE III
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE -- TRAIT ANXIETY
SOURCE

I

TOTAL

BETWEEN SUBJECTS I

F

1

729

.206

0

77 '743

22

3,534

3,699

25

4

1

4

.031

0

747

1

747

5.836

2,948

23

128

df

7,264

47

3,565

23

729

Conditions
Err orb
WITHIN SUBJECTS
I

Trials
Trials X
Conditions
Errorw

I

p

ms

SS

< .025

A slight trend is suggested indicating that some anxiety may have been

produced by the ambiguous situation in tolerant individuals; however, this
result only reaches the .20 level of significance -- far below an
acceptable criterion.

Table 4 abstracts the results of testing with the

MAT-50.
TABLE IV
ABSTRACT OF MAT-50 SCORES

N = 50
Age Range:
Mean Score

17 - 45;
=

3.53

Mean Age

= 25.6;

31 Females;

Variance

=

Standard Deviation

Standard Error of the Mean
Intolerants Scored

~

3.16

.137

19 Males

.054
Tolerants Scored

> 3.90

.370
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The results of t-tests calculated on before and after anxiety scores indicate
that no significant differences were apparent.

However, a trend is sug-

gested that state anxiety scores of the intolerant group were higher after
the administration of the Rorschach than pre-Rorschach state anxiety scores
(t=2.13, df=12, p <.10).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The data of the present study corroborates the research by Norton
(1975) indicating that individuals intolerant of ambiguity react to
ambiguous situations with anxiety.

The present author has made a distinction

between state and trait anxiety as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI).

It appears that not only is short term anxiety produced

when "intolerants" encounter ambiugity, as hypothesized, but the data
also suggest that trait or long-term anxiety is more characteristic of
"i.ntolerants" than of "tolerants".
However, it is suggested that the Rorschach is not entirely
responsible for elevated state anxiety scores in the intolerant group.
Significance was only at the .10 level when pre- and post-Rorschach
scores were compared, with post-Rorschach scores being higher.

The opinion

of the present author is that if the Rorschach were entirely responsible
for the production of anxiety in the intolerant group, the level of
significance would be much higher.

The author postulates that intolerants

found the entire testing situation anxiety produci.ng, the Rorschach was
only one ambiguous situation in several others.

Other ambiguous situations

in the testing environment could include the fact that subjects did not
know what was to take place in the situation.

The mere fact of not

knowing what the i.ndividual volunteered for could produce anxiety.
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The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory contains potentially ego threatening
statements of an individual's emotional state.

The STAI could produce

anxiety, especially if the individual did not know how the obtained
information was to be used.
Further research is suggested using subjects from a population
other than that of college students in introductory psychology classes.
Subjects from populations delineated by occupation, age and religion
may lend additional support to the present findings.

Individuals

attending institutions of higher education may provide a homogeneous
sample lacking extreme tolerant or extreme intolerant individuals.
For example, individuals making construction work their occupation as
compared with those in the social sciences or individuals subscribing
to narrow religious beliefs as compared with those with more flexible
beliefs may provide a wider range of tolerance-intolerance than college
students.
The results of the present study suggest that individuals who ar.e
intolerant of ambiguous situations find such situations anxiety producing.
In addition, intolerant individuals may suffer more long-term or constant
anxiety than intolerant individuals.
construct validation to the MAT-50.

The present study provides additional

19
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adorno, T.W.; Frenkel-Brunswik, E.; Levinson, D.J.; Sanford, R.N.
Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper, 1950.

The

Allport, Gordon; Ross, Michael. Personal religious orientation and
prejudice, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967,
5(4), 432-443.
Baker, Therese L. The dimensions of nonauthoritarianism, Journal of
Personality Assessment, 1976, 40(6), 626-634.
Batson, c. Daniel. Religion as prosocial: Agent or double agent?
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1976, 151, 29-45.
Bishop, Marion R. Trusting behavior as related to rigidity and tolerance
of ambiguity in the authoritarian, Dissertation Abstracts, 1967,
28(5-B), 2153-2154.
Bordin, Edward. Ambiguity as a therapeutic variable, Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, 1955, 19(1), 9-15.
Brown, S.

Social Psychology, New York:

Free Press, 1965.

Budner, Stanley. Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable,
Journal of Personality, 1962, 30(1), 29-50.
Chabassol, David. The measurement of some aspects of structure in
adolescence, Journal of Educational Research, 1973, 66(6),
247-250.
~
Chabassol, David; Thomas, David. Needs for structure, tolerance of
ambiguity and dogmatism in adolescents, Psvchological Reports,
1975, 37, 507-510.
Child, Irvin. Personality correlates of aesthetic judgment in college
students, Journal of Personali~y, 1965, 33, 476-511.
Crandall, James. Self-perception and interpersonal attraction as related
to tolerance-intolerance of ambiguity, Journal ~f Personality,
1969, 37, 127-140.
Crandall, James E. Effects of intolerance of ambiguity upon interpersonal
attraction, Psychological Reports, 1971, 28, 550.
Davids, Anthony. Some personality ?.nd intellectual correlates of
intolerance of ambiguity, Journal of Abnormal and Social tsychology,
1955, 51, 415-420.
Digenan, Marillac; Murray~ John B. Religious beliefs, religious commitment,
and prejudice, Journal of Social Psychology, 1975, 97, 147-148.

20
Ehrlich, Dantuta. "Intolerance of a-:nbiguity", Walk's A Scale:
comment, Psychological Reports, 1965, 17, 591-594.

Historical

Foxman, Paul. Tolerance for ambiguity and self-actualization, Journal of
Personality Assessment~ 1976, 40(1), 67-72.
Frenkel-Brunswik, Else. Intolerance of ambiguity as an emotional and
perceptual personality variable, Journal of Personality, 18, 1949,
108-14.3.
Harrower. M.R.; Steiner, M.E.
C.C. Thomas, 1973.

Large Scale Rorschach Techniques; New York,

Klopfer, Bruno; Ainsworth, Mary; Klopfer, Walter; Holt, Robert. Developments in the Rorschach Technique, New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1954.
MacDonald, A.P. Revised scale for ambiguity tolerance: Reliability
and validity, Psychological Reports, 1970, 26, 791-798.
Martin, Barclay. Intolerance of ambiguity in interpersonal and perceptual
behavior, Journal of Personality, 1954, 22, 494-503.
Masling, Joseph M. How neurotic is the authoritarian?
and Social Psychology, 1954, 49(2), 316-318.

Journal of Abnormal
~

Meek, Phyllis M. Extreme tolerance of ambiguity: A manifestation of
maladaptive behavior, Dissertation Abstracts, 1968, 29(3-B),
1162-1163.
Morrow, William. Rigidity of attitudes regarding personal habits and
its ideological correlates, Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 1954, 49; 89-93.
~
--Newmark, Charles; Hetzel, W.; Frerking, R. The effects of personality
tests on state and trait anxiety, Journal of Personality Assessment,
1974, 38(1), 17-20.
Norton, Robert. Manifestations of ambiguity tolerance through verbal
behavior in small groups, Communication Monographs, 1976, 43,
35-43.
Norton, Robert. Measure of Ambiguity Tolerance, Journal of Personality
Assessment, 1975, 39(6), 607-619.
O'Connor, Patricia. Ethnocentrism, "intolerance of ambiguity" and
abstract reasoning ability, Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 1952, 47, 526-530.
~
--Rehfisch, John M. A scale for personality rigidity, Journal of Consulting
Psychology, 22(1), 1958, 11-15.

21
Rokeach, 11. Generalized mental rigidity as a factor in ethnocentrism,
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1943, 48, 259-278.
Rokeach, Milton. Prejudice, concreteness of thinking, and reification
of thinking, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1951,
46, 83-91.
Rotter, J. Generalized expectancies of internal versus external control
of reinforcement, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied,
1966, 80(1).
Rydell, Susan. Tolerance of ambiguity and semantic differential ratings,
Psychological Reports, 1966, 19, 1303-1312.
Shavit, Hana. Personality adjustment as a function of . interaction between
locus of evaluation and tolerance of ambiguity, Psychological Reports,
1975, 37, 1204-1206.
Spielberger, C.D.; Gersch, R.L.; and Luchene, R. Manual for the StateTrait Anxiety ~nventory, Palo Alto, California: Consulting
Psychologists Press, 1970.
Troldahl, Verling C.; Powell, Fredric A. A short fortn dogmatism scale
for .use in field studies, Social Forces, 1965, 44(2), 211-214.

22
APPENDIX
MAT - 50
DIRECTIONS:

Block out the box on the answer sheet that best answers the following
questions. Use the following rating scale:
(1) always true, (2) mostly true, (3) more true than false, (4) equally
true and false, (5) more false than true, (6) mostly false, (7) always
false.
1.

Almost every problem has a solution.

2.

I like to fool around with ' new ideas, even if they are a total waste
of time.

3.

Nothing gets accomplished in the world unless you stick to some basic
rules.

4.

I do not believe that in the final analysis there is a difference
between right and wrong.

5.

Usually, the more clearly defined rules a society has, the better
off it is.

6.

Personally, I tend to think that there is a right way and a wrong way
to do almost everything.

7.

I prefer the certainty of always being in control of myself.

8.

I tend to be very frank with people.

9.

It irks me to have people avoid the answer to my question by asking
another question.

10.

I really dislike it when a person does not give straight . answers
about himself.

11.

It really disturbs me when I am unable to follow another person's
train of thought.

12.

I prefer telling people what I think of them even i f it hurts them,
rather than keeping it to myself.

13.

It would bother me if different close friends of mine had conflicting
opinions of me.

14.

I always want to know what people are laughing at.
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15.

It intensely disturbs me when I am uncertain of how my actions affect
others.

16.

It bothers me when I don't know how strangers react to me.

17.

I function very poorly whenever there is a serious lack of communication in a job situation.

18.

In a situati.on in which other people evaluate me, I feel a great
need for clear and explicit evaluations.

19.

If I am uncertain about the responsibilities of a job, I get very
anxious.

20.

If I were a scientist, I migtt become frustrated because my work
would never be completed (science will always make new discoveries).

21.

If I were a doctor, I would prefer the uncertainties of a psychiatrist
to the clear and definite work of someone like a surgeon or X-ray
specialist.

22.

Once I start a task, I don't like to start another task until I
finish the first one.

23.

Before any important job, I must know how long it will take.

24.

In a problem-solving group, it is always best to systematically
attack the problem.

25.

A problem has little attraction for me if I don't think it has a
solution.

26.

I do not like to get started in group projects unless I feel
assured that the project will be successful.

27.

In a decision-making situation in which there is not enough
information to process the problem, I feel very uncomfortable.

28.

I don't like to work on a problem unless there is a possibility
of coming out with a clear-cut and unambiguous answer.

29.

Complex problems appeal to me only if I have a clear idea of the
total scope of the problem.

30.

A group meeting functions best with a definite agenda.

31.

I seem to enjoy parties the most when I know most of the people there.

32.

Before going to a party, I always want to know what kind of a party
it is.

33.

I get pretty anxious when I'm in a social situation involving me
which I have little control of.
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34.

Whenever I am in a new grot•.p, I usually take the initiative in
introducing myself.

35.

First impressions tend to be very important to me.

36.

Whenever I go out to have fun, I like to have at least a vague
purpose in mind.

37.

I am just a little uncomfortable with people unless I feel that I
can understand their behavior.

38.

I don't feel comfortable with people until I can find out something
about them.

39.

I have a good idea of exactly how many friends I could really
count on.

40.

I like to know ahead of time what will be for dinner.

41.

Whenever I go on a long trip, I like to keep track of the miles
to go.

42.

I will not consider buying an item unless the price is clearly
marked on it.

43.

It matters to me to know what day it is.

44.

I get very anxious waiting to hear the elections results.

45.

I usually like to know what time it is.

46.

I want to know what a salesman is selling before I'll listen to him.

47.

It really bothers me when a person shows up late for an appointment
without an explanation.

48.

If I don't get the punch line of a joke, I don't feel right until
I understand it.

·

49.

I enjoy carefully rehashing my conversations in my mind afterwards.

50.

Before going out, I always check my appearance to make sure I look
right.

51.

I am tolerant of ambiguous situations.

52,

The best part of working a jigsaw puzzle is putting in that last piece.

53.

I tend to like obscure or hidden symbolism.

54.

Mysticism is too abstract and undefined for me to take seriously.

55.

If I miss the beginning of a good movie, I like to stay to see the
start of it.
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56.

Vague and impressionistic pictures appeal to me more than realistic
pictures.

57.

I tend to prefer pictures with perfect balance in the composition.

58.

I like movies or stories with definite endings.

59.

Generally, the more meanings a poem has, the better I like it.

60.

A poem should never contain contradictions.

61.

In the final analysis, the correct interpretation of a poem or story
is the author's interpretation.

